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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines the link between the cost of sovereign borrowing and climate 
risk for 40 advanced and emerging economies. Controlling for a large set of domestic and 
global factors, the paper shows that both vulnerability and resilience to climate risk are 
important factors driving the cost of sovereign borrowing at the global level. Overall, we find 
that vulnerability to the direct effects of climate change matter substantially more than climate 
risk resilience in terms of the implications for sovereign borrowing costs. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the effect on bond yields is progressively higher for countries deemed highly 
vulnerable to climate change. Impulse response analysis from a set of panel structural VAR 
models indicates that the reaction of bond yields to shocks imposed on climate vulnerability 
and resilience become permanent after around 12 quarters, with high risk economies 
experiencing larger permanent effects on yields than other country groups. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate risks can have material impact on the sustainability of public finances. In climate-
vulnerable countries, fiscal health is under threat by potential output losses related to 
climate hazards and disaster recovery costs, as well as transition risks that may hit 
specific sectors or the economy at large. For example, Koetsier (2017) finds a 
considerable increase in government debt for most damaging and deadliest disasters. 
While a growing body of research has studied the macroeconomic impacts of climate 
change (Hochrainer 2009; von Peter, von Dahlen, and Saxena 2012; Cabezon et al. 
2015; Batten 2018; Mercure et al. 2018; Cantelmo, Melina, and Papageorgiou 2019; 
Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka 2020), relatively little research has been conducted on 
the nexus between climate risk and sovereign risk. That said, recent research by Kling 
et al. (2018) on the relationship between climate vulnerability, sovereign credit profiles, 
and the cost of capital in climate-vulnerable developing countries shows that these 
countries incur a risk premium on their sovereign debt, reducing their fiscal capacity for 
investments in climate adaptation and resilience. 1  Although this is an area that is 
increasingly receiving attention from rating agencies, to date there has been little 
systematic research to investigate this deeper.2 
Our paper builds upon the work carried out by Kling et al. (2018), primarily through the 
use of a series of structural panel VARs that allow us to examine the response of bond 
yields to shocks imposed on climate risk and resilience. The regression analysis 
conducted in the first stage of our approach is largely consistent with the findings of Kling 
et al. (2018) in terms of the extent of the effect of climate risk on bond yields, although 
our paper employs alternative measures of climate risk and a higher data frequency. 
However, the main added value of our approach is the examination of how bond yields 
react to climate risk and resilience shocks which, crucially, control a large set of domestic 
and global factors. 
Our findings confirm that climate vulnerability has significant implications for sovereign 
borrowing costs, and that the direct effects of climate change matter substantially more 
than climate risk resilience. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is 
larger for countries deemed highly vulnerable to climate change. Impulse response 
analysis suggests that the reaction of bond yields to shocks imposed on climate 
vulnerability and resilience become permanent after around 12 quarters, and that high 
risk economies experience larger permanent effects on yields than other country groups. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the related literature. Section 3 lays out our empirical methodology and the 
data that we use. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of the price of sovereign risk, 
with early work by Edwards (1984) finding a strong role for domestic macroeconomic 
fundamentals to play in driving government bond spreads, particularly public debt, 
foreign reserves, the current account balance, and inflation. More recently, work on 
sovereign risk has been set against the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) find in a study of 31 advanced and emerging economies 
 
1  See also Buhr et al. (2018). 
2  Credit ratings agencies are increasingly incorporating climate risk into their assessment of sovereign risk 
and risk across other asset classes (e.g., Mathiesen 2018).  
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that worsening economic fundamentals are the main driver of the price  
of sovereign risk. However, in crisis times, a further important issue was found to  
be ‘fundamentals contagion’—i.e., an abrupt increase in financial market sensitivity to 
fundamentals. Other work by Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013), studying  
60 economies, find evidence that credit default swap (CDS) spreads for euro area 
periphery countries were mispriced based on a set of macroeconomic fundamentals (see 
also Amato 2005; Packer and Zhu 2005; Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli 2010). 
D’Agostino and Ehrmann (2014) focus on the G7 economies, showing that sovereign 
risk appears to have been mispriced both before and after the crisis. Favero and Missale 
(2012) make the point that when global risk aversion is high, this can increase the role 
played by fiscal fundamentals in driving the price of sovereign risk. The issue of 
contagion has also been a feature of the literature on government bond yields. Some of 
this work has focused on spillovers and contagion between sovereigns and banks. For 
example, Alter and Beyer (2014) test the effect on sovereign risk and bank CDS from 
unexpected shocks imposed on sovereign creditworthiness and country-specific bank 
indices. Other work has taken a financial integration perspective, with Baldacci and 
Kumar (2010) noting that price discovery in government bond markets and the more 
efficient pricing of sovereign risk are associated with the ongoing integration of 
government bond markets at the global level.  
There is a range of channels through which the cost of sovereign borrowing may be 
affected by climate change, and these are important to consider in the context of the 
current paper. One way that this may occur is through the depletion of natural capital, 
and implications for fiscal sustainability and the price of sovereign risk (e.g., Pinzón  
et al. 2020). Climate risk can also affect sovereign risk due to the fiscal impact of climate-
related natural disasters. For example, macroeconomic risks related to natural disasters 
and extreme weather include risks of a disruption of economic activity,  
which may adversely affect tax income and other public revenues and increase social 
transfer payments (e.g., Schuler et al. 2019). A further channel relates to the fiscal 
consequences of adaptation and mitigation policies for climate change. Public adaptation 
to climate change affects public budgets directly on the expenditure side (e.g., Bachner, 
Bednar-Friedl, and Knittel 2019). Likewise, investment in mitigation—for example, clean 
energy investment—can strain public finances, while climate mitigation policies such as 
carbon taxes can affect the revenue side. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (2019) estimations for a group of 31 developing countries suggest that 
public debt-to-GDP ratios would have to rise from 47% to 185% to finance basic 
investments to meet the Sustainable Development Goals in poverty, nutrition, health, 
and education if these investments had to be financed through debt. Many of these 
investments are linked to adaptation and mitigation. Less developed economies 
especially tend to have a relatively low debt servicing capacity and are vulnerable to the 
build-up of external debt. Since these are the countries with the greatest need for 
adaptation finance, it will be important to develop robust debt management frameworks 
and limit risk exposure to international debt financing.  
Climate change can also affect the cost of sovereign borrowing via broader 
macroeconomic implications. The first progress report of the Network of Central Banks 
and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) stresses that climate risks 
can have negative side effects on macroeconomic conditions, leading to lower 
investment, financial losses, and disruption in asset valuations (NGFS 2018). On the 
macroeconomic impacts of climate change, our paper contributes to the strand of 
literature that examines the implications of climate change for long-run economic growth. 
Supply and demand shocks from extreme weather events, although short-term in nature, 
can have lasting impacts on growth (Acevedo 2014; Klomp and Valckx 2014; Botzen, 
Deschenes, and Sanders 2019) and public finances. Moreover, the supply and demand 
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side effects of gradual global warming and transition impacts can cause fundamental 
and enduring structural changes to the economy, and adversely affect long-term output 
trajectories (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015a; Kahn et al. 2019). For many countries, 
climate change will have a profound impact on their long-run productive capacity and 
potential output. A country’s long-term growth potential will inevitably have ramifications 
for public finances and debt sustainability. In addition, the extent to which climate change 
affects financial stability can have ramifications for the cost of sovereign borrowing and 
the price of sovereign risk. For example, physical risks related to extreme weather 
conditions can cause a rise in bank credit risk owing to damage to the operating assets 
and production output of borrowers. This may lead to an inability of borrowers to meet 
their debt service obligations, and a higher incidence of non-performing loans, with 
negative implications for the sovereign risk profile. Bolton et al. (2020) note that central 
banks need to seriously consider a possible role as  
a ‘climate rescuer of last resort’ in a systemic financial crisis by purchasing significant 
amounts of impaired financial sector assets. Empirical research on bailouts indicates that 
there can be negative implications for public debt ratios (e.g., Acharya, Drechsler, and 
Schnabl 2014; European Central Bank 2015). Also, it is important to consider  
how natural disasters may impact upon international capital flows (e.g., David 2010; 
Escaleras and Register 2011; Osberghaus 2019), affecting balance of payments 
positions and thus sovereign risk. Finally, climate risk could lead to a rise in sovereign 
default rates should it lead to political instability. The positive link between political 
instability and sovereign default has been widely researched (e.g., Clark 1997; Cuadra 
and Sapriza 2008). However, more recently, there has been some work to show  
that climate-related disasters can lead to migration within and between countries,  
which may induce political instability (e.g., Black et al. 2011; Burke, Hsiang, and  
Miguel 2015b). 
While it is not the aim of our paper to test all of these transmission channels between 
climate risk and sovereign risk, we seek to empirically confirm the nexus between climate 
vulnerability and higher sovereign cost of debt identified by Kling et al. (2018). The latter 
study conducts a panel and principal component analysis with annual data for a sample 
of 46 countries over the period 1996–2016, and finds that countries with higher exposure 
to climate vulnerability, measured by indices from the Notre Dame Global Adaptation 
Initiative (ND-GAIN), exhibit higher cost of debt. 3  The present paper builds on this 
analysis, using higher frequency data and refined measures of climate vulnerability, risk, 
and resilience. Importantly, we also develop a set of structural panel VAR models to 
conduct an impulse response analysis and simulate shocks on climate vulnerability and 
resilience. 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
A twofold approach is implemented. First, using quarterly data frequency, we use a fixed 
effects panel model over the period from 2002Q1 to 2018Q4 across 40 countries, the 
sample of which includes advanced economies, emerging economies (EMEs), and the 
member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 4  
We also examine a sub-panel based on economies characterized as having high climate-
related risks, defined as being in the top quartile for risk exposure. The first stage 
examines the drivers of sovereign bond yields, based on a large set of macroeconomic 
 
3  In a related paper using firm-level data, Kling et al. (2020) show that climate vulnerability also affects the 
cost of corporate financing and access to finance, controlling for various firm-specific and macroeconomic 
factors. 
4  See Table A1 in the Appendix for the full list of countries. 
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data and two climate-related indicators (climate risk vulnerability  
and climate risk resilience). Drawing on the literature that examines the drivers of 
sovereign bond yields and the price of sovereign risk, the macroeconomic controls 
include the current account balance, public debt/GDP, the fiscal balance, GDP per 
capita, and GDP growth. These variables have been attained from Bloomberg, the IMF 
International Financial Statistics, the OECD, and China Economic Database (CEIC).5 
Regarding the climate vulnerability indicator, data for vulnerability to climate risk are 
taken from a refined version of the ND-GAIN vulnerability index developed by Kling et al. 
(2020). The refined vulnerability measure comprises all of the components from the ND-
GAIN vulnerability index that are not highly related to economic variables in order to 
mitigate against endogeneity concerns. 6  Data for climate resilience are from FTSE 
Russell. This indicator refers to the extent to which an economy has measures in place 
to address exposure to climate risks. Details of the construction of these variables are 
shown in the Appendix (Tables A3 and A4).7  
The following baseline equation is estimated: 
yi,t = βxi,t-1 + γZi,t-1 + χVIXt-1 + τUSYt-1 + CRISISi,t-1 + δi + εi,t i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T (1) 
where yi,t represents the government bond yield; xi,t represents a set of domestic 
macroeconomic fundamentals; Zj denotes our climate vulnerability and resilience 
indicators; VIX stands for the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, 
a measure of global risk aversion; USY are US long-term government bond yields; 
CRISIS represents the Laeven and Valencia (2018) indicator for the incidence of a crisis 
event for each country in the sample; δi are country fixed effects; and εi,t is the error term. 
The variables are lagged by one period to mitigate against endogeneity concerns. 
Second, a structural panel VAR is used to examine the response of sovereign bond 
yields to shocks to climate vulnerability and resilience. Crucially, these shocks control for 
a range of macroeconomic fundamentals and global factors. The panel SVAR is 
implemented across the same 40 countries as in stage one, but over the period from 
2007Q1 to 2017Q4 in a balanced set-up. The panel SVAR can be denoted as follows in 
its general specification, with structural shocks identified by a recursive restriction: 
𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)Δ𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (2) 
where A(L) is the matrix of lag polynomial; Yi,t refers to the demeaned value of Xt of 
country i to accommodate country-specific fixed effects; and εi,t is a vector of structural 
disturbances. Following the setting of the previous SVAR model, we take a first-
differencing form of Yi,t as ΔYi,t. The ordering of the variables imposed in the recursive 
 
5  See Table A2 in the Appendix for details of all variables used, including sources. 
6  The original ND-GAIN vulnerability index (Chen et al. 2015) comprises three core measures: (i) the extent 
to which an economy is exposed to significant climate change from a biophysical perspective;  
(ii) the degree to which an economy is dependent upon sectors that are particularly sensitive to climate 
change; and (iii) the extent of an economy’s adaptive capacity to climate change. This measure can 
therefore be interpreted as an overall measure reflecting both physical and transition climate-related risks. 
We use the refined measure by Kling et al. (2020) which strips out measures that are highly correlated 
with macroeconomic variables, so that the new vulnerability index is less correlated with countries’ 
financial or economic conditions, which might cause endogeneity. 
7  As can be seen from Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix, there is largely no overlap in the components of 
the climate vulnerability and resilience indicators. The only overlap applies to just one component, namely 
the freshwater withdrawal rate.  
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form is the same as the previous SVAR model. The panel VAR includes two lags selected 
by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
Our identification strategy is based on a block recursive restriction (Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999), which results in the following matrix 𝐴𝐴  to fit a just-
identified model: 
𝐴𝐴 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑎𝑎1,1 0 … 0
𝑎𝑎2,1 ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ 0
𝑎𝑎11,1 … 𝑎𝑎11,10 𝑎𝑎11,11⎦⎥⎥
⎤
 (3) 
The ordering of the variables imposed in the recursive form implies that the variables  
at the top (such as 𝑎𝑎1,1 ) will not be affected by contemporaneous shocks to the  
lower variables (such as 𝑎𝑎2,1,𝑎𝑎11,1, . .. ), while the lower variables will be affected by 
contemporaneous shocks to the upper variables. Usually, slower moving variables are 
better candidates to be ordered before fast-moving variables (Bruno and Shin 2015).  
It follows therefore that we place the climate vulnerability variable at the top in the 
ordering, which implies that it will only be affected by contemporaneous shock to itself. 
Following the vulnerability variable, we place the climate resilience variable second in 
the ordering, which implies that resilience will be affected by contemporaneous shocks 
to vulnerability and itself, but not by contemporaneous shocks to macroeconomic 
fundamentals or sovereign bond yields. Importantly, we put the sovereign yields in  
last place in the ordering, which is not only based on the assumption that climate risk will 
affect bond yields, but also on the consideration of our first-stage empirical results that 
imply the macroeconomic fundamentals that are driving bond yields. Last, we place our 
macroeconomic fundamentals in the middle of the ordering. The lag selection of the 
SVAR model is based on the AIC, which suggests that our model should be with two 
lags. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results from the estimation of equation (1) are provided in Table 1.8 The coefficients 
on the domestic and global factors accord largely with priors, and are  
also in alignment with the findings in the related literature. The results are presented 
across four main country groups: advanced economies, emerging markets, ASEAN, and 
a high risk group. 9  Across all countries as a whole, controlling for domestic and  
global factors, it is clear that vulnerability to climate risk and resilience to climate risk 
have significant effects on sovereign bond yields. Increases in vulnerability and lower 
resilience to climate risks lead to rises in bond yields.10 The premium on sovereign bond 
yields from rising climate risk vulnerability is highest for the high risk group at 275 basis 
points, compared to 155 basis points for ASEAN and 113 basis points for other EMEs. 
 
8  As shown in Figure A5 in the Appendix, the models estimated across all the country groups appear to 
explain sovereign bond yields well based on a comparison of actual yields and the yields implied by the 
models—i.e., the fitted values. 
9  The high risk group is defined as economies that are in the top quartile for climate risk exposure based 
on the refined ND-GAIN vulnerability index (Kling et al. 2020). This group comprises the following 
countries: Japan, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Singapore, the Philippines,  
Viet Nam, Thailand, Indonesia, and India. 
10  The direction of the effects is in line with intuition and also reflects the pattern that can be observed from 
raw plots of sovereign bond yields against our climate risk indicators (see Figures A1 to A4 in the 
Appendix). 
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The effect of vulnerability on bond yields for advanced economies is not statistically 
significant. As regards climate risk resilience, the magnitude of the effect  
on bond yields is substantially lower than that of climate risk vulnerability, with higher 
resilience associated with declines in bond yields by fewer than 10 basis points across 
all country groups.11 
Table 1: The Determinants of Sovereign Bond Yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All ADV EME ASEAN HRSK 
Climate risk vulnerability and resilience 
Vulnerability 0.634*** –0.001 1.134*** 1.549*** 2.753*** 
 (0.150) (0.164) (0.434) (0.328) (0.388) 
Resilience –0.067*** –0.084*** –0.070*** –0.057*** –0.057*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Domestic factors 
Current account/GDP –0.051*** –0.019 –0.127*** –0.0650*** –0.106*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.029) (0.013) (0.015) 
GDP per capita –0.748* –9.181*** –0.265 –4.587*** 1.049 
 (0.385) (0.992) (0.571) (0.868) (0.666) 
Public debt/GDP 0.016*** 0.013*** –0.0133* 0.0294*** 0.00991*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.008 –0.014 0.172*** –0.015 –0.023 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.035) (0.022) (0.020) 
GDP growth –0.180*** –0.142*** –0.242*** –0.042 –0.042* 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) 
Crisis 0.673*** 1.325*** –0.129 n/a 0.605 
 (0.203) (0.226) (0.377)  (0.743) 
Global factors 
US bond yield 0.803*** 0.832*** 0.587*** 0.282** 0.861*** 
 (0.052) (0.072) (0.092) (0.129) (0.101) 
VIX 0.049*** 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.006 0.038*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Constant –14.94** 102.3*** –36.96** –30.90* –142.3*** 
 (7.242) (13.16) (17.67) (17.54) (20.95) 
Observations 2,399 1,088 949 362 600 
R-squared 0.296 0.430 0.236 0.573 0.411 
Number of countries 40 17 17 6 10 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects No No No No No 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors, based on estimation of equation (1). 
The results are striking in two main ways. First, it is apparent that vulnerability to climate 
risk matters substantially more for the cost of sovereign borrowing than resilience to 
climate risk. In other words, exposure to the direct effects of climate change remains key, 
with a sizable and significant impact on the cost of sovereign debt for developing and 
emerging economies. Improving resilience efforts further may help to combat exposure 
to these direct effects and hence bring down the cost of sovereign financing. Second, it 
 
11  Interpretation of the coefficients on vulnerability and resilience applies to a unitary rise in the series’ which 
are standardized between 0 and 1. 
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is clear that the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is notably higher for economies 
that are more exposed to climate risks. In particular, the effect  
on bond yields for the high risk group is higher than for EMEs as a whole by a factor  
of about three, and higher than for ASEAN by a factor of around two. Our findings 
therefore suggest that those economies that are particularly exposed to climate change 
and have the greatest need for resilience investment face the highest climate risk 
premium on their sovereign borrowing costs. Given that a significant share of the 
financing of adaptation and vulnerability reduction measures would have to be borne  
by the public sector, a higher cost of borrowing could severely hamper these crucial 
investments.12 
Turning to the domestic macroeconomic fundamentals, worsening current account 
positions, lower GDP per capita, and lower GDP growth have detrimental effects on the 
cost of sovereign borrowing, increasing yields as expected. Economies with weak net 
international investment positions tend to have higher bond yields. Moreover, lower 
levels of economic development and growth prospects can lead to investor flight, thereby 
increasing sovereign bond yields. Other important factors affecting bond yields include 
the public debt/GDP ratio and the fiscal balance. On global factors, positive spillovers 
from the US bond market are evident in the majority of cases as expected, similar to 
global risk aversion. 
As a robustness check, we also examine alternative measures of climate risk 
vulnerability. These results are provided in Table A5 in the Appendix and are fully 
consistent with those from our baseline specification. Using measures of physical climate 
risks and transition risks taken from FTSE Russell (Table A6 in the Appendix), we find 
that both transition and physical risk are positively and significantly related to sovereign 
bond yields. On transition risks—i.e., risks related to shifting to a low-carbon economy—
we find that the magnitudes of the effects on sovereign bond yields are lower on average 
across our sample of countries than for physical risks or resilience. This may be related 
to the fact that financial markets have not yet fully priced in these risks. Nonetheless, the 
effect that we find is certainly not trivial, in particular for higher risk-exposed groups. On 
physical risks, we find that the effect on sovereign bond yields is significant in all cases 
apart from advanced economies. Exposure to the physical effects of climate risk is clearly 
a factor that policymakers should be increasingly aware of. As in our baseline, and as 
expected, we find that the magnitude of the effect on yields from physical climate risks 
is large for economies deemed to be exposed due to their geographic location and 
propensity for the incidence of natural climate-related disasters. These include the 
ASEAN group of countries in our sample, as well as  
sub-panels deemed high risk (the top quartile of countries based on physical and 
transition risk exposure) and very high risk (the top decile of countries based on physical 
and transition risk exposure). Indeed, we find that the magnitude of the effect on yields 
is progressively higher as the degree of risk exposure rises, in line with economic 
intuition. 
In order to understand better the relationship between sovereign bond yields and climate 
risk exposure and resilience, we delve into this issue further using a structural panel VAR 
approach. Across our full sample, as well as sub-panels, Figure 1 shows the effect on 
sovereign bond yields following a one standard deviation shock on climate risk 
vulnerability and resilience. 
 
12  Some have argued that adaptation measures should be conducted by the private sector and that  
the role of the government is limited to setting the right incentives (e.g., Tol 2005; Jones, Keen, and Strand 
2013). 
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Figure 1: Response of Sovereign Bond Yields to Climate Risk Vulnerability  
and Climate Risk Resilience Shocks 
All countries 
 
Advanced economies 
 
Emerging economies 
 
ASEAN 
 
High risk economies 
 
Note: Pink line represents 95% confidence interval. Blue line represents the impulse response of government bond yield 
to shocks. 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 1 indicates that across the sample of 40 countries, sovereign bond yields respond 
positively to a positive shock imposed on climate risk vulnerability, and negatively to a 
positive shock on resilience, in line with economic intuition. The shock becomes 
permanent after around 12 quarters. The direction of the effect of the shocks on bond 
yields is consistent across each of our sub-panels. Moreover, and in line with our stage 
one analysis, the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is notably larger for economies 
in the high risk category.  
For the high risk economies, the upward effect on yields of the vulnerability shock peaks 
at around six quarters, while for ASEAN and other EMEs, the peak is reached at a longer 
duration of around 15–18 quarters, albeit with lower magnitudes. The upward reaction of 
advanced economy bond yields also peaks after around six quarters. For shocks to 
climate risk resilience, the downward response of yields is most pronounced after around 
six quarters for EMEs, ASEAN, and the high risk group, with advanced economy bond 
yields peaking downwards much more quickly after around two quarters. Given that the 
effect of climate risk vulnerability and resilience to climate risk on sovereign bond yields 
is not transitory and does not subside over time, this underscores the importance for 
policymakers to ramp up efforts aimed at mitigating the effects of physical climate risks. 
Without such action, the negative ramifications for fiscal sustainability and, as a result, 
economic growth could be substantial. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the effects of climate vulnerability on 
the price of sovereign risk and fiscal sustainability. Set against the a growing literature 
highlighting the impacts of climate risks on macroeconomic conditions, this paper tests 
empirically the link between climate vulnerability and resilience to climate risk and 
sovereign bond yields. This is also an important issue to consider in light of the increasing 
incorporation of climate risk by credit risk agencies in their sovereign rating 
methodologies. Using a diverse sample of 40 advanced and emerging economies, many 
of which are particularly vulnerable to climate risks due to their geographical location and 
susceptibility to natural disasters, our results provide evidence that climate risks and 
resilience to these risks have significant effects on the cost of sovereign borrowing. In 
particular, higher climate risk vulnerability and, to a lesser extent, lower climate risk 
resilience, lead to significant rises in the cost of sovereign borrowing. Given the material 
effects of climate change on the cost of sovereign borrowing, our analysis indicates that 
more attention needs to be paid to the incorporation of climate risk into the operational 
frameworks of central banks. Moreover, the issue warrants further consideration by 
financial supervisors from a financial stability perspective. Last but not least, our findings 
strongly suggest that adaptation investments that help to mitigate climate risks would 
contribute to a lowering of the cost of sovereign debt, and this would provide much-
needed fiscal space to those countries particularly affected by climate change. 
  
ADBI Working Paper 1160 Beirne, Renzhi, and Volz 
 
10 
 
REFERENCES 
Acevedo, S. 2014. “Debt, Growth and Natural Disasters: A Caribbean Trilogy.” IMF 
Working Paper No. 14/125. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Acharya, V. V., I. Drechsler, and P. Schnabl. 2014. “A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts 
and Sovereign Credit Risk.” Journal of Finance 69, no. 6: 2689–2739. 
Aizenman, J., M. Hutchison, and Y. Jinjarak. 2013. “What is the Risk of European 
Sovereign Debt Defaults? Fiscal Space, CDS Spreads and Market Pricing of 
Risk.” Journal of International Money and Finance 34 (C): 37–59. 
Alter, A., and A. Beyer. 2014. “The Dynamics of Spillover Effects during the European 
Sovereign Debt Turmoil.” Journal of Banking and Finance 42: 134–153. 
Amato, J. D. 2005. “Risk Aversion and Risk Premia in the CDS Market.” BIS Quarterly 
Review Part 5 (December): 55–68. 
Bachner, G., B. Bednar-Friedl, and N. Knittel. 2019. “How Does Climate Change 
Adaptation Affect Public Budgets? Development of an Assessment Framework 
and a Demonstration for Austria.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for 
Global Change 24: 1325–1341. 
Baldacci, E., and M. S. Kumar. 2010. “Fiscal Deficits, Public Debt, and Sovereign Bond 
Yields.” IMF Working Paper No. 10/184. Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund. 
Batten, S. 2018. “Climate Change and the Macro-economy: A Critical Review.” Bank of 
England Staff Working Paper No. 706. London: Bank of England. 
Batten, S., R. Sowerbutts, and M. Tanaka. 2020. “Climate Change: Macroeconomic 
Impact and Implications for Monetary Policy.” In Ecological, Societal, and 
Technological Risks and the Financial Sector, edited by T. Walker, D. Gramlich, 
M. Bitar, and P. Fardnia, forthcoming. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Beirne, J., and M. Fratzscher. 2013. “The Pricing of Sovereign Risk and Contagion 
during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Journal of International Money and 
Finance 34 (C): 60–82. 
Black, R., S. R. G. Bennett, S. M. Thomas, and J. R. Beddington. 2011. “Climate 
Change: Migration as Adaptation.” Nature 478, no. 7370: 447–449. 
Bolton, P., M. Despres, L. A. Pereira Da Silva, F. Samama, and R. Svartzman. 2020. 
The Green Swan: Central Banking and Financial Instability in the Age of 
Climate Change. Basel, Switzerland: Bank of International Settlements. 
Botzen, W., O. Deschenes, and M. Sanders. 2019. “The Economic Impacts of Natural 
Disasters: A Review of Models and Empirical Studies.” Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy 13, no. 2: 167–188. 
Bruno, V., and H. S. Shin. 2015. “Capital Flows and the Risk-taking Channel of 
Monetary Policy.” Journal of Monetary Economics 71 (C): 119–132. 
Buhr, B., U. Volz, C. Donovan, G. Kling, Y. Lo., V. Murinde, and N. Pullin. 2018. 
Climate Change and the Cost of Capital in Developing Countries. Geneva  
and London: UN Environment, Imperial College London and SOAS University  
of London. 
Burke, M., S. M. Hsiang, and E. Miguel. 2015a. “Global Non-linear Effect of 
Temperature on Economic Production.” Nature 527 (November): 235–239. 
ADBI Working Paper 1160 Beirne, Renzhi, and Volz 
 
11 
 
Burke, M., S. M. Hsiang, and E. Miguel. 2015b. “Climate and Conflict.” Annual Review 
of Economics 7: 577–617. 
Cabezon, E., L. Hunter, P. Tumbarello, K. Washimi, and Y. Wu. 2015. “Enhancing 
Macroeconomic Resilience to Natural Disasters and Climate Change in the 
Small States of the Pacific.” IMF Working Paper No. 15/125. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Cantelmo, A., G. Melina, and C. Papageorgiou. 2019. “Macroeconomic Outcomes in 
Disaster-Prone Countries.” IMF Working Paper No. 19/217. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Cecchetti, S., M. S. Mohanty, and F. Zampolli. 2010. “The Future of Public Debt: 
Prospects and Implications.” BIS Working Paper No. 300. Basel, Switzerland: 
Bank of International Settlements. 
Chen, C., I. Noble, J. Hellmann, J. Coffee, M. Murillo, and N. Chawla. 2015. University 
of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index. Country Index Technical Report, Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.  
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans. 1999. “Monetary Policy Shocks: 
What Have we Learned and To What End?” In Handbook of Macroeconomics, 
Vol. 1, edited by J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford, 65–148. Amsterdam, 
Netherlands: Elsevier. 
Clark, E. 1997. “Valuing Political Risk.” Journal of International Money and Finance  
16: 477–490. 
Cuadra, G., and H. Sapriza. 2008. “Sovereign Default, Interest Rates and Political 
Uncertainty in Emerging Markets.” Journal of International Economics 76, no. 1: 
78–88. 
D’Agostino, A., and M. Ehrmann. 2014. “The Pricing of G7 Sovereign Bond Spreads: 
The Times, They are A-Changin’.” Journal of Banking and Finance 47: 155–
176. 
David, A. C. 2010. “How do International Financial Flows to Developing Countries 
Respond to Natural Disasters?” IMF Working Paper No. 10/166. Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Edwards, S. 1984. “LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An Empirical 
Investigation, 1976–80.” American Economic Review 74, no. 4: 726–734. 
Escaleras, M., and C. A. Register. 2011. “Natural Disasters and Foreign Direct 
Investment.” Land Economics 87, no. 2: 346–363. 
European Central Bank. 2015. “The Fiscal Impact of Financial Sector Support during 
the Crisis.” Economic Bulletin 6. Frankfurt, Germany: European Central Bank. 
Favero, C., and A. Missale. 2012. “Sovereign Spreads in the Eurozone. Which 
Prospects for a Eurobond?” Economic Policy 27: 231–273. 
Hochrainer, S. 2009. “Assessing the Macroeconomic Impacts of Natural Disasters.  
Are There Any?” Policy Research Working Paper 4968. Washington, DC:  
World Bank. 
Jones, B., M. Keen, and J. Strand. 2013. “Fiscal Implications of Climate Change.” 
International Tax and Public Finance 20, no. 1: 29–70. 
Kahn, M. E., K. Mohaddes, R. N. C. Ng, M. H. Pesaran, M. Raissi, and J.-C. Yang. 
2019. “Long-Term Macroeconomic Effects of Climate Change: A Cross-Country 
ADBI Working Paper 1160 Beirne, Renzhi, and Volz 
 
12 
 
Analysis.” NBER Working Paper No. 26167. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Kling, G., Y. C. Lo, V. Murinde, and U. Volz. 2018. “Climate Vulnerability and the Cost 
of Debt.” Centre for Global Finance Working Paper No. 12/2018. London: SOAS 
University of London. 
Kling, G., U. Volz, V. Murinde, and S. Ayas. 2020. “The Impact of Climate Vulnerability 
on Firms’ Cost of Capital and Access to Finance.” SOAS Centre for Sustainable 
Finance Working Paper. London: SOAS University of London. 
Klomp, J., and K. Valckx. 2014. “Natural Disasters and Economic Growth: A Meta-
Analysis.” Global Environmental Change 26: 183–195. 
Koetsier, J. 2017. “The Fiscal Impact of Natural Disasters.” Tjalling C. Koopmans 
Research Institute Discussion Paper No. 17-17. Utrecht: Utrecht University 
School of Economics. 
Laeven, L., and B. Valencia. 2018. “Systemic Banking Crises Revisited.” IMF Working 
Paper No. 18/206. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Mathiesen, K. 2018. “Rating Climate Risks to Credit Worthiness.” Nature Climate 
Change 8: 454–456. 
Mercure, J.-F., H. Pollitt, J. E. Viñuales, N. R. Edwards, P. B. Holden, U. Chewpreecha, 
P. Salas, I. Sognnaes, A. Lam, and F. Knobloch. 2018. “Macroeconomic Impact 
of Stranded Fossil Fuel Assets.” Nature Climate Change 8: 588–593. 
Network for Greening the Financial System. 2018. First Progress Report. Paris, 
France: Network for Greening the Financial System. 
Osberghaus, D. 2019. “The Effects of Natural Disasters and Weather Variations on 
International Trade and Financial Flows: A Review of the Empirical Literature.” 
Economics of Disasters and Climate Change 3: 305–325. 
Packer, F., and H. Zhu. 2005. “Contractual Terms and CDS Pricing.” BIS Quarterly 
Review 8 (March): 89–100. 
Pinzón, A., N. Robins, M. McLuckie, and G. Thoumi. 2020. The Sovereign Transition to 
Sustainability. Understanding the Dependence of Sovereign Debt on Nature. 
London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, and Planet Tracker. 
Schuler, P., L. E. Oliveira, G. Mele, and M. Antonio. 2019. “Managing the Fiscal Risks 
Associated with Natural Disasters.” In Fiscal Policies for Development and 
Climate Action, edited by M. A. Pigato, 133–153. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Tol, R. S. J. 2005. “Adaptation and Mitigation: Trade-offs in Substance and Methods.” 
Environmental Science and Policy 8, no. 6: 572–578. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2019. Trade and Development 
Report 2019: Financing a Global Green New Deal. Geneva, Switzerland: United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
Von Peter, G., S. von Dahlen, and S. Saxena. 2012. “Unmitigated Disasters? New 
Evidence on the Macroeconomic Cost of Natural Catastrophes.” BIS Working 
Paper No. 394. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements. 
  
ADBI Working Paper 1160 Beirne, Renzhi, and Volz 
 
13 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1: List of Countries  
Advanced Emerging ASEAN High Risk 
Australia 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Columbia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
India 
Israel 
Mexico 
Nigeria 
People’s Republic of China 
Peru 
Poland 
Republic of Korea 
Russian Federation 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
Indonesia 
India 
Japan 
Netherlands  
Philippines 
Republic of Korea 
Singapore 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
Table A2: Overview of Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis 
Variable Data Source Definition 
Sovereign bond yield Bloomberg 10-year government bond yield. 
Vulnerability  ND-GAIN and Kling et al. 
(2020) 
The refined vulnerability measure by Kling et al. 
(2020) comprises all of the components from the 
ND-GAIN vulnerability index that are not highly 
related to economic variables. 
Resilience FTSE Russell Resilience refers to a country’s preparedness 
and actions to cope with climate change. 
Current account/GDP OECD and CEIC The current account balance to GDP ratio. 
GDP per capita The World Bank Real GDP per capita at constant 2010 US$. 
Public debt/GDP IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
The public debt as a share of GDP, defined as 
general government gross debt to GDP ratio. 
Fiscal balance/GDP IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
The fiscal balance as a share of GDP, defined as 
cyclically adjusted primary balance to GDP ratio. 
GDP growth OECD and CEIC The real GDP growth rate. 
Crisis Laeven and Valencia 
(2018) 
The Laeven and Valencia (2018) indicator for the 
incidence of a crisis event for each country in the 
sample. 
US bond yield Bloomberg US 10-year government bond yield. 
VIX Bloomberg VIX stands for the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, a measure of 
global risk aversion. 
Transition risk FTSE Russell Transition risk from mitigation encompassed by 
GHG emission requirements. 
Physical risk FTSE Russell Fundamental climate-related risk to the country 
and its economy 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Table A3: Measures for Climate Vulnerability 
Sector Indicators 
Food Projected change of cereal yields 
 Projected population change 
 Food import dependency 
Water Projected change of annual runoff 
 Projected change of annual groundwater recharge 
 Fresh water withdrawal rate 
 Water dependency ratio 
Health Projected change of deaths from climate-induced diseases 
 Projected change in vector-borne diseases 
Ecosystems Projected change of biome distribution 
 Projected change of marine biodiversity 
 Ecological footprint 
 Protected biome 
 Engagement in international environmental conventions 
Habitat Projected change of warm periods 
 Projected change of flood hazard 
Infrastructure Projected change of hydropower generation capacity 
 Projected change of sea level rise impacts 
 Dependency on imported energy 
 Population living less than 5m above sea level 
Source: Compiled by authors drawing from Kling et al. (2020). 
Table A4: Resilience Index 
Sub-Index Indicators 
Institutional Intended country C02 emissions in 2030 
 Government effectiveness 
 Disaster preparedness index  
 External debt as % of GDP 
Social Fuel subsidies 
 GINI index 
 Human Development Index 
 Voice and accountability 
 People using sanitation services (% of population) 
 Access to electricity (% of population) 
Economic Country CDP performance ratio 
 Insurance penetration index 
 R&D expenses 
 Logistics performance index 
 Doing business 
 Country green bonds performance ratio 
 Water productivity 
 Agricultural adaptive capacity 
Ecological Annual freshwater withdrawals 
 Share of protected areas 
 Share of biodiversity threatened 
 Biodiversity stock 
 Afforestation rate 
Source: Compiled by authors using data from FTSE Russell. 
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Table A5: Robustness Using Alternative Climate Risk Variables:  
The Determinants of Sovereign Bond Yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All ADV EME ASEAN HRSK VHRSK 
Climate risk and resilience 
Transition risk 0.637*** 0.408*** 0.260* –0.450 1.264*** 0.968** 
 (0.078) (0.117) (0.135) (0.301) (0.244) (0.477) 
Physical risk 0.644*** 0.115 0.782** 2.780** 4.346*** 18.060*** 
 (0.170) (0.182) (0.320) (1.176) (1.366) (2.335) 
Resilience –3.768*** –6.054*** –4.026*** –2.691*** –4.127*** –4.098*** 
 (0.136) (0.492) (0.161) (0.391) (0.293) (0.366) 
Domestic factors 
Current account/GDP –0.109*** –0.041*** –0.156*** –0.094*** –0.253*** –0.408*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.0167) (0.023) (0.021) (0.068) 
GDP per capita –0.184** 0.215 –0.405*** –1.438*** 0.336 1.491** 
 (0.0834) (0.329) (0.126) (0.247) (0.221) (0.733) 
Public debt/GDP –0.004*** –0.004*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.057*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.027** 0.037** 0.193*** –0.115*** –0.094*** –0.143* 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.034) (0.028) (0.033) (0.085) 
GDP growth –0.211*** –0.236*** –0.289*** 0.0309 0.0349 –0.145* 
 (0.024) (0.046) (0.023) (0.049) (0.042) (0.075) 
Crisis 1.126*** 1.553** 1.289*** n/a 2.873*** 2.367** 
 (0.393) (0.665) (0.359)  (0.720) (0.993) 
Global factors 
US bond yield 1.332*** 1.257*** 1.777*** 0.453 1.102* 0.951 
 (0.212) (0.171) (0.474) (0.656) (0.655) (0.628) 
VIX 0.124 0.148** 0.108 0.056 0.054 –0.022 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.140) (0.087) (0.215) (0.194) 
Constant 11.72*** 19.59*** 13.64*** 14.11** –10.22 –73.38*** 
 (1.819) (3.112) (3.013) (6.527) (7.818) (14.84) 
Observations 2,459 1,139 1,006 314 535 350 
R-squared 0.678 0.618 0.744 0.865 0.686 0.660 
Number of countries 39 17 17 5 9 6 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The high risk group comprises Colombia, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Peru, and Nigeria; the very high risk group comprises India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Peru, and Nigeria. 
Source: Authors based on estimation of equation (1). 
Table A6: Physical Risk and Transition Risk Indices 
Index Components 
Physical Risk Index Death caused by climate extremes 
Sensitivity of agriculture 
Sea-level rise exposure 
Transition Risk Index Territorial distance to reach compliant emissions target of 2°C by 2050  
Greenhouse gas emissions gap between trend and distance to target 
Source: Compiled by authors using data from FTSE Russell. 
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Figure A1: Sovereign Bond Yield and Climate Risk: Advanced Economies 
 
 
 
Note: Red line represents government bond yield in percentage. Blue dashed line represents vulnerability. Dark green 
dashed line represents resilience. 
Source: Authors, with data from Bloomberg, FTSE Russell, ND-GAIN, and Kling et al. (2020). 
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Figure A2: Sovereign Bond Yield and Climate Risk: Emerging Economies 
 
 
 
Note: Red line represents government bond yield in percentage. Blue dashed line represents vulnerability. Dark green 
dashed line represents resilience. 
Source: Authors, with data from Bloomberg, FTSE Russell, ND-GAIN, and Kling et al. (2020). 
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Figure A3: Sovereign Bond Yield and Climate Risk: ASEAN 
 
Note: Red line represents government bond yield in percentage. Blue dashed line represents vulnerability. Dark green 
dashed line represents resilience. 
Source: Authors, with data from Bloomberg, FTSE Russell, ND-GAIN, and Kling et al. (2020). 
Figure A4: Sovereign Bond Yield and Climate Risk: Regions 
 
Note: Red line represents government bond yield in percentage. Blue dashed line represents vulnerability. Dark green 
dashed line represents resilience. 
Source: Authors, with data from Bloomberg, FTSE Russell, ND-GAIN, and Kling et al. (2020). 
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Figure A5: Actual and Fitted Values 
 
Note: Red line represents actual value of government bond yield in percentage. Dark blue dashed line represents its fitted 
value. 
Source: Authors. 
